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Abstract—In this paper we propose a distributed recharg-
ing rate control algorithm which combines the objectives of
regulating frequency and improving the utilization of electric
generators. An incentive policy  is created that encourages
Electric Vehicles (EVs) to demand energy when non-EV demand
is low and the electric generators are underutilized. EVs also act
as frequency regulators which can control their participation role
by modifying their respective payment rate wi. The proposed
distributed recharging rate control algorithm can realize a
Demand Management solution for EVs and does not require
explicit real time communication from the electric generators or
between the recharging sockets. A mechanism is presented that
can trade off an ideal incentive policy with its approximation,
and enable the integration of the proposed controller with legacy
protection system. Simulation is used to assess the algorithm and
to highlight its embedded characteristics.
Index Terms—Demand management, distributed algorithms,
frequency regulation, electric vehicles, multi-agent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
ACCORDING to the International Energy Agency’s CO2emission report 2009 [1], transport is a significant con-
tributor to global CO2 emission with 23% share. As expected,
in the transport industry, a transition to Electric Vehicles (EVs)
is taking place and it is very likely that most transport in
the future will be electric [2]. Several studies have attempted
to predict the impacts of EVs on the electric grid [3]. It is
well understood that without any intervention from the electric
grid EVs will add to evening peak demand as each EV would
recharge as soon as it is plugged in. With increasing penetra-
tion of renewable energy sources, this scenario will not only
cause operational problems for the electric grid but will also
further aggravate the problem of underutilization of electric
generators resulting from large peak demand and reduced off
peak demand. Various solutions that cope with intermittent
renewable energy sources have been suggested in the literature
e.g., operating large electric generators as reserves has been
suggested in [4], storage of energy is considered in [5] and
the use of Demand Side Management (DSM) is addressed in
[6]. Recently, there has been an increased interest in using
EV batteries as part of storage systems to counterbalance the
intermittency of renewable energy sources. Ideally, storage
systems should be managed in such a way that transport and
power system are integrated [7], [8]. We refer to these systems
as EV energy Demand Management (DM) systems.
Kempton et al. [9] suggest that EVs may be used benefi-
cially in Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) regime where EVs act as small
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generators to absorb some of the peak demand. Kempton et
al. [6] and Lund et al. [8] have also suggested that EVs may
be used to support renewable energy sources if their demand
is managed intelligently. Lopes et al. [10] present similar
suggestions and compare three recharging strategies namely i)
dumb recharging ii) dual tariff and iii) smart recharging. White
et al. [11] address the use of V2G mode of operations and
suggest a dual functionality for EVs as frequency regulators
and peak shavers. They showed that there are strong financial
incentives for EV owners to use EVs for frequency regulation.
Finally, using DM, EVs may also be integrated with the power
system as a subset of DSM as suggested in [6], [8] and [10].
While these works highlight the importance of EV energy DM,
they hardly expand on suggesting how such a DM system may
be implemented.
In this paper we propose a recharging rate control algorithm
for parked EVs, where a large percentage of these EVs behave
as variable power and delay tolerant loads and coexist with
other types of loads. The proposed recharging rate control
algorithm i) can realize a DM solution to reconcile energy
demand from autonomous EVs with the output of e.g., renew-
able energy sources and ii) can realize an alternate mechanism
for frequency regulation in the event of e.g., changes in output
power of electric generators.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a
review of the related work. Section III describes the architec-
ture of system under consideration, the components of system,
and their inter relationship. Section IV presents a distributed
recharging rate control algorithm for recharging EV batteries.
Section V provides an implementation of recharging rate
control and simulation results. Section VI uses an example to
relate the recharging rate control with the recharging strategy
of EVs and generation capacity control. We conclude this
paper in Section VII and comment on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
An EV energy Demand Management problem is essentially
a scheduling problem which manifests two key features: i)
Each EV battery is recharged to the desired state of battery
charge during the period between two consecutive journeys; ii)
The aggregate demand from EVs could fill the valley that non-
EV demand produces. Feature ii) can also be interpreted to be
aiming at minimizing the difference between the instantaneous
marginal cost of generation and its average over 24 hours. Such
interpretation includes the availability of renewable energy
sources and hence the aggregate demand from EVs may not
necessarily be seen as a flat valley filling demand.
The work on EV energy DM can be broadly classified into
two distinct categories depending on the level of autonomy of
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EVs: i) the recharging schedule is controlled by the electric
grid ii) the recharging schedule control is delegated to au-
tonomous EV agents. In the first case EVs report their recharge
requirements to a dispatch center which in turn produces a
recharging schedule for each EV [12]. Despite the apparent
simplicity of the electric grid controlled scheduling, to the best
of our knowledge, polynomial time algorithms that compute
optimal recharging schedules have not been published. In the
second case each EV is allowed to self-schedule the recharging
time according to the criterion known only to the respective
EV agent [7], [13].
The research work on DM with autonomous EVs can be
further divided into two classes: i) day ahead negotiation and
ii) real time bargaining. The former class includes works where
EVs can bid for energy the day before the actual demand [14].
The algorithm developed in this paper belongs to the latter
class where EV agents bargain in real time and learn from
historic demand patterns. The publications relevant to the work
presented in this paper are reviewed in the remainder of this
section.
Galus et al. [7] present a framework for recharging EVs
using an energy hub system. They note that EVs must be
granted autonomy in recharging decisions and suggest use
of a multi-agent system (MAS). In principle, we support the
use of a MAS framework for EV energy DM and pursue a
similar broader objective of integrating transport and power
systems. However, our solution is quite different: Galus et
al. [7] integrate EVs into multi carrier energy networks by
solving an optimal energy dispatch problem whereas in this
paper we propose to integrate EVs as frequency regulators.
Also, in [7] a hub manager aggregates several hundred EVs
and requires information from each EV to provide a solution.
The hub manager maintains a list of arriving/departing EVs
and allows new EVs to join only at the start of 15 minute
intervals. The solution proposed in this paper works with or
without aggregation of EVs and allows EVs to join at arbitrary
times.
Though the economic aspects of DM can be understood
using classical economics and game theory, the mechanics of
resulting energy transactions and the impacts on the operation
of the system have received little attention in the literature. For
example, Vytelingum et al. [15] and Wei et al. [16] attempt to
present MAS based solution to manage micro storage devices
including EVs. However, they do not consider the actual
mechanism by which agents acquire energy and assume that
agents can buy it at market price. Such MAS can be integrated
on top of the algorithm described in this paper.
Ma et al. [13] use non-cooperative game theory to analyze
the recharging strategies of EVs and make the observation
that the recharging games for EVs are conceptually similar
to the routing games in networks. They consider EVs as cost
minimizing rational agents coupled through a common energy
price where each agent solves its local optimization problem.
In the limit of infinite population, the decentralized strategies
of EVs result in a unique Nash equilibrium that has the
property of filling valleys in non-EV demand. In comparison to
[13], our work addresses a few novel aspects of decentralized
recharging of EVs. We show not only that EVs can decide
strategy in a decentralized manner, but also that the impact of
the strategy and resulting incentive can also be computed using
decentralized recharging rate controllers. This paper presents a
novel attempt to include in a unified framework: the recharging
strategies of EVs, operational aspect of frequency regulation
and the utilization of the electric generators.
Some studies on Load Frequency Control (LFC) or fre-
quency regulation can be found in the literature [17]. Recently,
researchers have become interested in using EVs to provide
frequency regulation services [18]. The recharging rate control
proposed in this paper may also be classified as an LFC
mechanism. However, the mechanism suggested here is novel
in that it combines frequency regulation with incentive policy
provision for autonomous EV agents.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A. Physical Architecture
Electric Vehicles connect to the distribution system through
recharging sockets. Each recharging socket has its own
recharging rate controller (socket agents). In the proposed
architecture, recharging sockets are enabled round the clock
and do not adhere to a centralized recharging policy. Each EV
has an agent that can communicate with a recharging socket
and make a demand for energy. Recharging sockets receive
these demands and provide energy accordingly. Thus EVs
may be considered as autonomous buyers and the recharging
sockets as points of sale.
After completing a journey EVs will connect to recharging
sockets. The ith EV agent will send a signal wi;1 [$/h] to
the socket agent indicating its preferred rate of payment to
get recharged, and in return the socket agent will allocate a
recharging rate of pi [kw] and will broadcast on the current
policy 1= [$/kwh]. From now on we will also refer to pi [kw]
as the recharging rate of ith EV. EVs may also indicate their
willingness to discharge in V2G mode and communicate wi;2
[$/h] to recharging sockets which will indicate their desired
rate of payment for discharging.
When connecting to the recharging socket an EV agent
may decide a value of wi;1 [$/h] based on its current status
and requirements for the next journey, which may include;
current battery state of charge, expected remaining time to a
new journey (TLi), expected travel time of next journey and
total budget for recharging (Bd).
B. Logical Architecture
The framework aims at exploiting the following character-
istics of EVs to manage their demand.
1) EVs are indifferent to the exact time of recharge comple-
tion as long as usual/scheduled journeys are not affected.
2) EV population has heterogeneous energy needs.
 Not all EVs need to recharge their battery to maxi-
mum capacity each day.
 Not all EVs have the same journey patterns
3) Many EVs can tolerate uncertainty in exact battery state
of charge provided they can achieve a minimum battery
state of charge.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 3
      
 
	
	
	 
  


	
	

	


		

		
	
    

 	!"
#
$
$
	
	
	
		
%&$

    
	
   
   
Fig. 1. Components of the Demand Management problem.
We decompose the EV energy DM problem into three inter
related components, namely:
1) Distributed recharging rate control,
2) On line resource acquisition,
3) Capacity control.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between these components
which are organized at two levels. Level 1 represents the
activities on the demand side and level 2 represents activity
on the generation side. We now briefly describe the function
of each component.
Component 1: Distributed Recharging Rate Control: Com-
ponent 1 controls the energy transfer rate for EVs based on real
time availability of energy. Its aim is to balance the aggregate
demand with the time varying generation capacity set by Com-
ponent 3. In the event that non-vehicular demand exceeds the
generation capacity, Component 1 reduces the recharging rate
for all EVs to zero and possibly allocates negative recharging
rates (V2G mode of operations [9]). If generation capacity
exceeds the non-vehicular demand, then recharging rates are
allocated to EVs according to their respective payment rate
wi;1 [$/h]. This paper will mainly focus on the solution of
Component 1 of EV energy DM system.
Component 2: On line Resource Acquisition: This compo-
nent is intended to capture the behaviour of autonomous EV
agents when they submit wi;1, and to analyze the equilibrium
properties of the system. Given a generation capacity, it is
possible for an autonomous EV agent to increase its recharging
rate wi;1 relative to other EVs. Increasing wi;1, however, does
not mean that the recharging rate of that EV will necessarily
increase because competing EVs agents can also decide to
increase their respective wk;1. This situation can be modelled
as a game [19] and in Section VI we present a simple instance
of such game.
Component 3: Capacity Control: Component 1 uses capac-
ity as an exogenous variable and cannot control it. A scenario
may be constructed where capacity is zero and Component 1
can only reach one solution which is to reduce the recharging
rate to zero for all EVs. Component 1 will enforce this solution
irrespective of what EVs wish to pay. Hence, to ensure that
EVs may receive sufficient power, decision on the generation
side is needed, which is the capacity control. This capacity
control problem can be modelled as a Revenue Management
(RM) problem.
C. Remarks on EV agents and Recharging Sockets
In regards to the interaction between the EV and socket
agents, upon connection the EV agent can submit to the socket
agent an arbitrary small value of wi;1 [$/h] which is the
payment rate at which EV is willing pay for recharging. In
turn, the EV agent obtains from the socket agent a signal 1=
[$/kwh] which can be interpreted as the instantaneous price
of unit of energy. In this setting the EV agent’s action of
submitting a wi;1 [$/h] is equivalent to submitting a demand
for pi =  wi;1 [kw]. After this initial interchange of signals
EV agents can continuously monitor changes in 1= [$/kwh],
and they can decide autonomously if their rate of payment
wi [$/h] needs modification. We assume that EV agents are
continuously trying to reconcile their internal goals, as for
example, their predicted battery state of charge (BSOC) at
the start of their next journey with their remaining budget and
current payment rate.
On the other hand, the sockets are continuously solving
a Nash bargaining problem that will allocate to each EV
attached to the socket a recharging rate that is proportionally
fair. At equilibrium, 1= [$/kwh] should be such that no EV
changes its payment rate wi;1 [$/h]. Note that with the above
mechanism EVs need only to communicate to the local socket
wi;1 [$/h] and can discover their equilibrium charging rates
pi [kw] in a distributed manner. We further note that from
the perspective of a socket, the equilibrium payment rates
wi;1 [$/h] are still exogenous variables and can be considered
arbitrary.
There are unlimited ways in which EV agents and socket
agents can agree to more elaborated ways of interchanging
information. For example, the socket agents could broadcast
forecasts of near future 1= [$/kwh] values. This line of
research is out of the scope of this paper but is certainly worth
further investigation.
IV. DISTRIBUTED RECHARGING RATE CONTROL
A. Problem Formulation
Notation
V (t) = set of EVs recharging at time t,
VV 2G(t) = set of EVs willing to participate in V2G
when needed,
N = Number of recharging EVs,
pi = Recharging rate (at which energy is accumulat-
ing in the ith EV battery [kw] (or otherwise, when
not specified, [p.u.]) 1,
wi;1 = ith EV’s payment rate (paid by EV) for
recharging [$/h],
1p.u = per unit. Hence, these units have been normalized
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wi;2 = ith EVs payment rate (paid to EV) for
discharging in V2G mode [$/h],
PSCH(t) = Scheduled Power [p.u],
PNEV (t) = Power demand from non-EV loads [p.u.],
C(t) = PSCH(t)   PNEV (t) = Net power capacity
available to recharge EVs in G2V mode [p.u.],
PV 2G(t)= Aggregate power drawn from EVs in V2G
mode [p.u.],
pimax = Maximum allowed power at which ith EV’s
battery can be recharged [p.u.],
pimaxV 2G = The maximum allowed power at which
ith EV’s battery can be discharged [p.u.],
!= frequency deviation [p.u.],
PEV =
PN
i=1 pi [p.u.],
P = [p1; p2; : : : pN ] [p.u.],
W1 = [w1;1; w2;1; : : : wN;1] [$/h].
Recharging sockets may advertise two modes of operation for
EVs:
 Mode 1: if C(t) > 0, The EVs in V (t) act as energy
sinks.
 Mode 2: if C(t) < 0, EVs in VV 2G(t) act as energy
sources.
In addition to the EVs considered in sets V (t) and VV 2G(t),
some EVs may choose to discharge their batteries while
C(t) > 0. In the framework here presented, we can add
their discharging rates to C(t) and consider them as virtual
generators maximizing their revenue. Similarly, EVs are al-
lowed to recharge when C(t) < 0. If this is the case, they
are assimilated as non-EV loads and their recharging rates are
added to PNEV .
We now introduce the two objective functions of the two
optimization problems that the socket agents are continuously
solving. The choice of these objective functions has its foun-
dations in the Nash bargaining mechanism from cooperative
game theory [20], [21]. The Nash bargaining solution frame-
work enables the implementation of fair allocation of resources
among contending agents and it can be seen as a generalization
of the widely studied proportional fairness principle. For
example, in [22] the proportional fairness principle was used
to assign rates fairly to different contending elastic data traffic
demands. For more on fairness and optimization the reader is
referred to [23], [24]. With this choice of objective function
in mind, the socket controllers (agents) set the recharging
rate of connected EVs by solving the following optimization
problems.
Mode 1
maximize
P
X
ijvi2V (t)
wi;1(t)log(pi(t))
subject to
X
ijvi2V (t)
pi(t)  C(t)
0  pi(t)  pimax 8 ijvi 2 V (t)
(1)
Mode 2
maximize
P
X
ijvi2VV 2G(t)
wi;2(t)log( pi(t))
subject to
X
ijvi2VV 2G(t)
 pi(t)  PV 2G(t)
  pimaxV 2G  pi(t)  0 8 ijvi 2 VV 2G
(2)
Note that for the proposed recharging rate control wi;1(t),
wi;2(t), C(t) and PV 2G(t) are exogenous variables and cannot
be controlled: wi;1, wi;2 are determined by autonomous EV
agents while C(t) and PV 2G(t) are set by the capacity
controller.
In respect to (1) and (2), it can be verified that these
equations represent two convex optimization problems [25].
Many numerical methods are able to provide the instantaneous
solution, but the dynamic nature of the problem, the geograph-
ical spread of the EV population and scalability of solution
can present difficulties when centralized solvers are used. We
note that (1) and (2) represent two problems that change with
time. EVs/non-EV loads arrive and depart at random times.
A centralized solver would need to collect data and solve
the problem every time some change occurs. Therefore, our
interest is in distributed and on-line optimization approaches
since recharging sockets need to solve the problem in real
time with minimum communication overhead. We choose
a solution approach based on solving convex optimization
problems using sliding mode control [26] which yields an on-
line distributed solution that requires only binary information
about the state of the system which in our case is frequency.
Using results from [27], it can be shown that the following dif-
ferential inclusions converge to the solutions of the problems
described by (1) and (2).
Mode 1
d(pi(t))
dt
=
wi;1(t)
pi(t)
1 1(pi(t))  (1 + 1(pi(t))) (3)
where
1 =
(
1 if
P
ijvi2V (t) pi(t)  C(t);
0 otherwise
(4)
1(pi(t)) =
8><>:
1 if pi(t)  pimax ;
 1 if pi(t)  0 ;
0 otherwise
(5)
and
1(pi(t)) =
(
1 if (pi(t)) = 0;
0 otherwise
(6)
Mode 2
d(pi(t))
dt
=
wi;2(t)
pi(t)
2 2(pi(t)) + (2 + 2(pi(t))) (7)
where
2 =
(
1 if -
P
ijvi2VV 2G(t) pi(t)  PV 2G(t);
0 otherwise
(8)
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2(pi(t)) =
8><>:
1 if pi(t)   pimaxV 2G ;
 1 if pi(t)  0 ;
0 otherwise
(9)
Here  > 0 and  > 0 are tunable parameters which are
the same for all recharging sockets.
B. Optimal Recharging Rate
In Mode 1, at the optimal point of (1) the recharging rate
of ith EV is given by
pi =
(
wi if wi < pi;max;
pimax otherwise
(10)
where  is some constant which is the same for all EVs and
has units of [kwh=$]. We refer to 1= as price per unit of
energy.
Proof: pi  pi;max as this condition is enforced by the
second constraint in (1).
To show the recharging rate at the optimal point of the
problem in (1), we start by considering all the EVs. let Nj =
N , Cj = C and Vj = V and j = 1 where j indicates the
iteration number of the following procedure. Here Sj is used
as abbreviation of step j.
1) Procedure A:
S1) Assume that second constraint is absent. We solve (1)
only with first constraint. Dropping the second con-
straint, we transform the optimization problem (1) into
an equivalent problem by a change of variable.
xi = log(pi) (11)
and formulate an equivalent problem (12) to the original
problem as follows
maximize
xi
X
ijvi2Vj(t)
wi;1(t)xi(t)
subject to
X
ijvi2Vj(t)
exi(t)  Cj(t)
(12)
Since the objective is linear we can use vector
notation to represent it. Let us define W1;j =
[w1;1; : : : ; wNj ;1]
T 2 RNj , Xj = [x1; : : : ; xNj ]T 2
RNj , Ex;j = [ex1 ; : : : ; exNj ]T and Pmax;j =
[p1max; : : : ; pNjmax]
T . For simplicity we can drop the
notation that shows dependence on t and write
maximize
Xj
W1;j
TXj
subject to 1TEx;j  Cj
(13)
Here, we are maximizing a linear function over a convex
region. Thus at the optimal point, the hyper plane
W1
TX = b must be tangent to the feasible region
where b 2 R. We note that at the optimal point,
W1;j
TX = b is tangent to a level curve of function
1TEx;j corresponding to the level curve defined by
1TEx;j = Cj . Now since the gradient of a function
is normal to its level curves, we conclude that W1;j is
parallel to the gradient of 1TEx;j .
Note that r(1TEx;j) = Ex;j = Pj = [p1; : : : ; pNj ]T
Thus we can write
W1;j
kW1;jk =
Pj
kPjk (14)
where k:k is the Euclidean Norm and hence, pi = jwi
for i = 1; : : : ; Nj where j =
kW1;jk
kPjk
S2) We divide EVs into two sets G1 and G2 depending on
the solution of the most recent iteration of S1. An EV
is assigned a set using following equation.
vi 2
(
G1;j if jwi;1 < pi;max;
G2;j otherwise
(15)
where all EVs in G2;j are those whose recharging rates
would violate the second constraint in (1) if it was
present.
S3) If G2;j is empty then go to S4. otherwise, for all EVs in
G2;j , assign pi = pi;max. For these EVs we have found
the optimal solution because the objective is concave
increasing in pi and it can be shown that j+1  j for
all j  1. For rest of EVs in G1;j , if G1;j is empty, then
go to S5. Otherwise set Cj+1 = Cj  
P
ijvi2G2;j
pi;max,
Vj+1 = G1;j , Nj+1 = jG1;j j and go to S1 with reduced
problem under consideration.
S4) Now for all EVs left under consideration, none must be
recharging such that the second constraint in (1) can be
violated. Hence we have reached the solution. Go to S6.
S5) Since G1;j is empty, we stop because for all EVs pi =
pi;max and go to S6.
S6) Suppose we reach S6 in qth iteration. It follows that
we can define G1 = G1;q and G2 = [qj=1G2;j
which contains all EVs recharging at maximum possible
recharging rate and  = q where
vi 2
(
G1 if pi = wi;1 < pi;max
G2 if pi = pi;max
(16)
Since a given EV in V (t) must be either in G1 or in
G2, the equation (10) follows.
The EVs in G1 are the recipients of the proportional service
because their recharging rates are directly proportional to their
respective payment rates. We consider EVs in G2 as the
recipients of the priority service since they are recharged at
the maximum possible recharging rate.
C. Value of  in jth Iteration of Procedure A
During jth iteration of step 1 of procedure A,
pi =
wi;1PNj
k=1 wk;1
Cj (17)
.
Proof: Here we show that
pi =
wi;1PNj
k=1 wk;1
Cj , pi = wi;1 kPjkkW1;jk (18)
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suppose
pi =
wi;1PNj
k=1 wk;1
Cj
then
pi =
wi;1PNj
k=1 wk;1
kW1;jk
kW1;jkCj
thus
pi =
wi;1
kW1;jk
vuut w1;1CjPNj
k=1 wk;1
!2
+   +
 
wNj ;1CjPNj
k=1 wk;1
!2
hence
pi =
wi;1
kW1;jk
q
p21 +   + p2Nj
thus
pi = wi;1
kPjk
kW1;jk
alternatively suppose
pi = wi;1
kPjk
kW1;jk for i = 1 : : : Nj (19)
then
NjX
k=1
pk =
NjX
k=1
wk;1
kPjk
kW1;jk
hence
kPjk
kW1;jk =
PNj
k=1 pkPNj
k=1 wk;1
Using this value in (19), we get
pi = wi;1
PNj
k=1 pkPNj
k=1 wk;1
but
PNj
j=1 pj = Cj at the optimal point since objective is
concave increasing in pi
pi =
wi;1PNj
k=1 wk;1
Cj
Which completes the proof.
Note that this result is true for qth iteration and hence true
for every EV in G1 and allows us to view the recharging rate
controller as a discriminatory scheduler. Thus for EVs in G1
we can write
pi =
wi;1P
kjvk2G1 wk;1
CG1 (20)
and
 =
CG1P
kjvk2G1 wk;1
(21)
where CG1 is capacity being used to recharge EVs in G1.
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Fig. 2. Implementation using a single turbine and isolated synchronous
machine
D. Characteristics of 
Using the proposed recharging rate control, autonomous EV
agents are encouraged to submit demand at the time of high
availability of energy and to disperse their demand relative
to each other. From (21), the following characteristics of the
incentive policy  can be identified.
1)  is directly proportional to the available generation
capacity. For a given payment rate, EVs get better
recharging rates if their demand time matches with the
time of high availability.
2)  is a monotonically decreasing function of the number
of recharging EVs. When large number of EVs submit
demand at the same time, the recharging rates reduce
for all EVs. For a given payment rate, EVs can achieve
better recharging rates if they disperse their demand
relative to each other instead of submitting it at the same
time.
E. Pareto Efficiency
Let ui(pi; wi;1) be the utility of ith EV which is concave
increasing in pi and decreasing in wi;1. Using the results
presented in [28], it can be shown that, assuming that all EVs
are rational and autonomous, and that they observe the same
value of  for their chosen wi;1, the equilibrium recharging
rates are Pareto efficient.
F. Proportional Fairness
Let P0 = [p01; p02; : : : ; p0N ] be a recharging rate vector for
N EVs that is feasible. For a given payment rate vectorW1 =
[w1;1; w2;1; : : : ; wN;1], we say that P0 is proportionally fair
if for any other feasible P1 6= P0 the aggregate weighted
proportional change is negative. i.e.,
NX
i=1
w0i
p1i   p0i
p0i
< 0 (22)
Using a similar argument as presented in [22], it can be shown
that the optimal recharging rates are proportionally fair.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Single Machine Implementation
We first consider an isolated and unregulated synchronous
machine who’s rotor is initially rotating at synchronous speed
and arbitrary initial EV recharging rates such that initial net
torque on rotor is zero. Such a machine can be modelled by
the following linear differential equation [29]
2H
d(!(t))
dt
+D!(t) = PM (t)  PNEV (t) 
NX
i=1
pi(t)
(23)
Where H [p.u] is the inertia constant of machine, D [p.u] is
the damping torque, ! [p.u] is the frequency deviation and
PM [p.u] is the input mechanical torque to the machine which
is the scheduled power.
Let 0  PM  1; 0 < D  1;H > 0 and 0 < PNEV 
1 be constants such that PM   PNEV <
PN
i=1 pimax and
PM   PNEV  
PN
i=1 pi(0)  0 then from any given initial
values of 0 < pi(0)  pimax for i = 1; : : : N , the system
of differential inclusions (24) converges to pi(t) as in (10)
with  as in (21) such that j!j   where  is small as
compared to the statutory frequency deviation.
2H
d(!(t))
dt
+D!(t)  PM (t) +
NX
j=1
pj(t) + PNEV (t) = 0
d(pi(t))
dt
  wi;1(t)
pi(t)
1(t) 1(pi(t))  (1(t) + 1(pi(t))) = 0
for i = 1, 2, : : : , N
(24)
Computing the values of 1 and 2 using equations (4) and
(8) will require knowledge of recharging rates pi of all EVs.
To ensure scalability, we compute the value of 1 and 2 by
using frequency deviation !.
1 =
(
1 if ! < 0;
0 otherwise
(25)
and
2 =
(
0 if ! < !V 2G;
1 otherwise
(26)
Proof:
The first equation in (24) can be rewritten as
2H
d(!(t))
dt
+D!(t) = C(t)  PEV (t) (27)
where C(t) = PM (t)   PNEV (t) and PEV (t) =PN
j=1 pj(t)
Dividing both sides (27) by 2H , multiplying by integrating
factor e(
D
2H )t, integrating and multiplying by e (
D
2H )t after
integration, we get
!(t) =
e (
D
2H )t
"Z t
0
e(
D
2H )
2H
(C()  PEV ()) d + c0
#
(28)
We can write
!(t) = g1(t)g2(t) (29)
where g1(t) = e (
D
2H )t and
g2(t) =
"Z t
0
e(
D
2H )
2H
(C()  PEV ()) d + c0
#
(30)
If 1 = 0:
Suppose 0 < !(0) = c0 < , we take 1 = 0. Hence
pj(t) = min(
R t
0

wi(t)
pj(t)
dt

; pj;max). Hence PEV (t) =PN
j=1min(
R t
0

wi(t)
pj(t)
dt

; pj;max) is a monotonically in-
creasing function of time. Since C(t) <
PN
i=1 pimax, it
follows that C(t) < PEV (t) for some t > t0. If C(0) <
PEV (0), then t0 = 0. It follows from (30), that g2(t) increases
monotonically for t < t0 and starts decreasing for t > t0.
This decrease is rapid because e
D
2H t increase rapidly although
C(t)   PEV (t) < 0 is very small. Thus we conclude that
!(t) < 0 for some t > t1 > t0 and hence 1 = 1 for t > t1.
If 1 = 1:
Now, suppose   < !(0) = c0 < 0, we take
1 = 1. Hence pj = max(pj(0)   t; 0). Here PEV (t) =PN
j=1max(pj(0) t; 0) is a monotonically decreasing func-
tion of time. Since C(t) > 0, it follows that C(t) > PEV (t)
for some t > t3. If C(0) > PEV (0), then t3 = 0. It follows
from equation (30), that g2(t) decreases for t < t3 and then
increases for t > t3. Hence !(t) > 0 for some t > t4 > t3.
Hence the equilibrium point of (24) is the same as the
equilibrium point of (3).
In respect to the previous proof, we note that the frequency
deviation follows a differential equation and lags the imbal-
ance between generation and demand as it is shown by (28).
This frequency deviation is used to create a sliding mode at
!(t) = 0, which also creates a corresponding sliding mode
at C(t) = PEV (t).
We also note that it is possible to use frequency deviation
!(t) as proxy to compute 1 instead of using equation
(4). Thus, the recharging rates that converge to (10) can be
calculated in a distributed manner.
We note that alternative methods for extracting the required
information on power imbalance may exist but we leave this
line of investigation for future research.
Figure 3 shows the recharging rates pi and frequency
deviation ! when recharging 5 EVs using Pbase = 100 [kw]
generator. Here, H =1 [s], D=1 [p.u], PNEV = 0.9 [p.u],PN
i=1 pi = 0.1 [p.u] with random pi, W1 = [1; 2; 3; 4; 5]
 = 1,  = 1. It can be observed that if total load is initially
balanced then the recharging rate controller achieves intra EV
redistribution of recharging rates such that the recharging rates
converge to P = [0:67; 1:33; 2; 2:67; 3:33] [kw] which
are in accordance with their respective payment rates. The
redistribution is achieved in such a way that the rotor of the
synchronous machine rotates at synchronous speed and hence
a change in input torque is not required and 1= converges to
0.67 [kwh/$] at all the recharging sockets.
We note that the following are special cases when an intra-
EV redistribution of recharging rates will occur
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Fig. 3. Recharging rates and frequency deviation for single machine case
i) Demand submitted by a new EV
ii) Completion of a demand or departure of an EV
iii) A change in wi;1 by ith EV agent.
iv) A change in Non-EV load
B. EV Agent’s Budget and Decentralized Billing
When EV agents connect to the socket they know the budget
Bd that they have at their disposal to achieve, e.g., a target
battery state of charge BSOCi before their next journey. What
they do not know is the state of the electric grid and hence
they are unaware of the value of 1=. However, all EV agents
can submit a small wi;1 and within a few seconds (Section
V-E, Fig. 5) they will receive from the socket agent the signal
1=. From this point onwards the EV agent can start making
informed decisions by tracking its remaining budget and
estimating the total cost of recharging: as a first approximation
at the moment of connection Bd  MPi  wi;1  TL where
TL = t1  t0 is the total time available to recharge the battery.
Here, t0 is the EV initial time of connection to socket and t1
is the time of departure of the EV. Therefore, the EV agent
and the sockets agent can estimate the cost incurred (current
value of bill) using (31).
MPi(tn) =
Z tn
t0
wi;1(t)dt (31)
Where tn is the current time. The EV agent will also be
able to monitor at all times its state of recharge using (32):
BSOCi(t0; tn) =
Z tn
t0
pi(t)dt (32)
Hence, each EV agent can continuously monitor the changes
in 1= and dynamically adapt the value of wi;j to satisfy their
own internal objectives. For example, it could be constantly
aiming at saving as much as possible from its remaining
budget (Bd MPi(tn)  0) as long its target BSOCi(tn) is
being achieved.
A rational EV agent will stop paying once its battery has
been recharged to the target capacity. Hence the EV agent
can set wi;1 = 0 and this will instantly stop recharging the
EV battery. At the time of disconnection, the socket agent
will have no further information on wi;1 and the bill can be
transmitted to a centralized location.
Fig. 4. Frequency to function map for the socket manager
C. A Protocol Based on the Recharging Rate Controller
In order to deploy the recharging rate controller in a
multimachine system, we will need to take into account the
following considerations.
1) Local frequency measurement estimates are based on
voltages and currents at the sockets which will contain
various harmonics due to intra machine rotor oscilla-
tions, distortion and noise. It might not be possible to
measure frequency to the desired accuracy with high
resolution at each socket.
2) Different sections of network may have slight mismatch
in frequency at a given instant in time. The measure-
ments taken by all sockets are not necessarily the same.
Therefore, we modify the recharging rate controller and
propose a socket management protocol. We consider a socket
manager agent that can communicate with the sockets and
other controllers in the power system. The socket manager
broadcasts a pseudo frequency signal to all sockets. Two
messages are sufficient to send the pseudo frequency signal.
i) FAN frequency above nominal
ii) FBN frequency below nominal
In addition the socket manager broadcasts two messages that
are not part of the original control. These messages can
temporarily hold the socket state or shed its load when needed.
iii) LSS lock socket state
iv) SSL shed socket load
let m(tk) be a message received by ith socket at time tk.
The recharging rate for ith socket is given by (33) on page 9,
where  is an arbitrarily small constant.
The socket manager has the following key functions.
1) Generates the pseudo frequency signal for recharging
rate controllers
2) Allows any critical control to act without interference
from recharging rate controllers by allowing locking of
sockets.
3) Integrates with the protection system to shed all EV
load or sheds all EV load if frequency falls below the
statutory limit and switches the sockets to Mode 2.
Those EVs which are willing to discharge are used as
V2G sources.
To generate the pseudo frequency the socket manager maps
the frequency to functions as shown in Fig. 4 where the
functions, their descriptions and the corresponding messages
are shown in the following text.
1) SHD sheds all EV load. A SSL messages is transmitted
every T [ms].
2) URG Decreases the recharging capacity for EVs. A
FBN message is transmitted every T [ms].
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pi(tk  t  tk+1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pi(tk) +
R t
tk

wi;1
pi()

d   (pi(t))(t  tk) if m(tk) = FAN and pi(tk) 6= 0
 if m(tk) = FAN and pi(tk) = 0
pi(tk)  (1 + (pi(t)))(t  tk) if m(tk) = FBN
0 if m(tk) = SSL
pi(tk) if m(tk) = LSS or message loss in transit
(33)
3) RDB Redistributes recharging rates among EVs accord-
ing to their respective payment rates. A FAN message
is transmitted and a FBN message follows it by Tf [ms]
where Tf  T . The pattern is repeated every T [ms].
Tf is computed such that Tf = 0 at the lower boundary
of RDB region of map in Fig. 4 and increases linearly
to Tf = T at the upper boundary of RDB region.
4) DRG Increase the capacity for recharging EVs. A FAN
message is transmitted very T [ms].
D. Benefits of Proposed Protocol
1) All sockets act on the same information and do not
need to accurately measure the frequency with high
resolution.
2) Message communication to all sockets is broadcast,
hence, addressing of individual sockets is not needed.
3) Recharging sockets can temporarily use local frequency
measurements if communication link is broken and can
revert to using global measurement when link is re-
established
4) Exact measurement of frequency is not required at each
socket and pseudo frequency can be generated using an
approximation of exact frequency
5) Interference to critical controls in the power system is
avoided by locking sockets when needed.
E. Simulation Results
In this section we present simulation results with the
recharging rate control implemented together with the socket
management protocol. We use a power system with primary
frequency regulation provided by steam reheat turbines with
droop based governors as modelled in [30]. The average
frequency deviation ! can be expressed by the following
equation as derived in [30].
! =

R!2n
DR+ 1

(1 + FHTR)PSP   (1 + TRs)Pe
s2 + 2!ns+ !2n

(34)
Where
!2n =
DR+ 1
2HRTR
(35)
 = !n

2HR+ (DR+ FH)TR
2DR + 1

(36)
and
Pe = PSCH   PNEV   PEV (37)
Where
R = Speed droop or regulation,
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Fig. 5. Snapshot of recharging rates as function of wi;1
FH = Fraction of power from high pressure section
of turbine,
TR = Reheat time constant [s],
Pe = Electrical power [p.u],
PSP = Incremental set point [p.u],
The configuration parameters are: N = 1000, Pbase = 50
[Mw]  = 1,  = 1, PNEV (t0) = 0.9, PM (t0) = 0, t0 = 0,
wi are uniformly distributed random variables between 0 and
5 [$/h] (considered constant during the simulation), pi(t = 0)
are uniformly distributed between 0 and 10 [kw] such thatPN
i=1 pi = 0:1 [p.u] (to ensure initial balance condition),
pimax = 10 [kw] H = 3.5 [s], R = 0.05, FH = 0.3, D=1,
TR = 8 [s], PSP = 0, T = 20 [ms] and RDB region has
boundaries at ! = 0:0002 [p.u]
Figure 5 shows the snapshots of recharging rates pi as
function of wi at t = 0, 25, 50, and 100 [s] respectively. Thus
recharging rates are redistributed and EVs are dynamically
partitioned into G1 and G2 with   2:2 [kwh/$].
Figure 6 shows the frequency deviation for a 1% sudden
non-EV load loss at t = 0 [s]. This step change in C(t) contains
a wide spectrum of frequencies. When the high frequency
components of the step C(t) are significant, the controller
detects a significant difference between PEV (t) and C(t)
which is reflected in the values of ! when (t  10 [s]).
When t > 10 [s] the magnitude of high frequency components
of C(t) become negligible compared to its moving average
value over a few minutes and PEV (t) follows C(t). In the
case of this example, it can be seen that, when the proposed
recharging rate control is used, the peak frequency deviation
is reduced by 50%. Hence, a 66% smaller primary frequency
regulating turbine is sufficient to provide frequency regulation.
We note that the highlighted characteristics can be very helpful
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control
in reducing the turbine size that is needed to regulate the
fluctuations of, e.g., the output of renewable energy sources.
For the multiple machine case, we can observe that if the
size of RDB > 0 (Fig. 4) this will result in a steady state
value j!j > 0 which is constant (Fig. 6) and bounded by
half of the width of the RDB band. We note that as the width
of the RDB region approaches zero, the controller in (33) will
in the limit behave as the controller used in the single machine
case (24) except in rare circumstances when the EV load is
shed because of the frequency falling below the statutory limit.
Since steady state frequency deviation is constant, we
observe that C(t) = PEV (t) but a small power will flow
from generators providing droop based regulation. However,
we would like to point out that had the parked EVs not been
present, a much larger power flow from regulating generators
would have occurred as observed in Fig. 6.
VI. RECHARGING STRATEGIES, DEMAND DEFERMENT
AND CAPACITY CONTROL
As previously mentioned, the socket agents will broadcast
the same value of 1=. Assuming that EV agents are perfectly
rational and autonomous with utility ui(pi; wi;1) such that
each EV can exchange pi = wi;1 [kw] with wi;1 [$/s] in
an environment where the energy providers are maximizing
their revenue, the EV agents will choose wi;1 such that the
resulting equilibrium recharging rates are Pareto efficient and
proportionally fair.
Let CCR(C)[$=h] be the generation cost rate of C [kw].
In general, the cost rate is a convex function and the marginal
cost rate of generation @CCR@C is increasing function of C. Thus
in the context of a competitive generation market, a generator
will maximize revenue if:
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +C0 =
1

=
P
ijvi2G1 wi;1
C0
(38)
To show why  encourages deferment of demand by some
EVs, we will focus on Mode 1 of operations and we will
illustrate a simple game. Let us consider rational and selfish
EV agents which try to maximize their BSOC and minimize
their total incurred cost. We note that all rational EVs will
be in G1 as any EV in G2 can decrease its payment rate
without decreasing its recharging rate. As we have previously
introduced, the total cost incurred by the ith EV agent over
a time tn   t0 will be MPi(tn) (31), and the corresponding
change in battery state of charge BSOCi(tn) (32). From
Fig. 5, we can see that pi converges to wi;1 in a few seconds
even when EVs submit random values of wi;1 at the same
time, hence. 2
BSOCi(t1) =
Z t1
t0
pi(t)dt 
Z t1
t0
(t)wi;1(t)dt (39)
Lets now consider a game with two EVs: V1,V2 and two
time slots t1 and t2 of same time width Tc. We denote a
recharging strategy as (ti; tj) where V1 chooses the ith time
slot and V2 chooses the jth time slot. In this game, there
are four recharging strategies namely a1 = (t1; t1); a2 =
(t1; t2); a3 = (t2; t1) and a4 = (t2; t2). For simplicity, we
assume that PNEV is the same in both time slots. Also let
the equilibrium value of  be A when EVs choose the same
time slot, and B when they choose different time slots. We
define the payoffs of EVs as the ratio BSOC(t1)=MPi(t1)
which, in a steady system, as wi;1 is not changing, is the value
. We will now show that a1 and a4 are unstable and a2 and
a3 are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The payoff matrix can
be written as
V1; V2 t1 t2
t1 A; A B ; B
t2 B ; B A; A
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR TWO EVS
When the EVs choose the same time slots, the collective
revenue rate of the electric generator from recharging both
EVs at the same time is 2w and it will be w when EVs choose
different time slots. Let CA denote the capacity allocated
by the generator when EVs choose the same time slots and
CB denote the capacity allocated by generator when EVs
choose different time slots. C is zero in a time slot if no
EV chooses that slot. For slots chosen by at least one EV, we
now determine CA and CB . Thus we can write
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CA =
2w
CA
(40)
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CB =
w
CB
(41)
Multiplying (41) by 2, rearranging and comparing with a
rearranged version of (40), we get
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CACA = 2
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CBCB (42)
All quantities in (42) are positive. Furthermore, @CCR@C is
a convex increasing function of C. It follows that CA > CB
and
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CA >
@CCR
@C
jC=PNEV +CB (43)
2pi will converge to wi even faster than the rate of convergence shown
in Fig. 5 when the number of arriving/departing EVs are small compared to
the number of already parked EVs.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 11
Now rearranging (42) we get
CA = 2
@CCR
@C jC=PNEV +CB
@CCR
@C jC=PNEV +CA
CB (44)
From (44) and (43), we conclude that CA < 2CB . Noting
that 1A =
2w
CA
and 1B =
w
CB
, we can write
A = B
CA
2CB
(45)
and hence,
A < B (46)
Using (46), we can interpret the payoff matrix of the game
in Table I and observe that a1 and a4 are unstable, and that
a2 and a3 are two pure Nash equilibria strategies. Hence
both EVs will benefit if only one of them defers its demand.
Furthermore, we note that there are an unlimited number of
equivalent strategies as any EV does not need to recharge
continuously in one session.
If we consider EVs as players in this iterative game,
each EV agent will endeavour to achieve, e.g., a desired
BSOC(tn) before it’s next journey commences while min-
imizing the total cost incurred. These EV agents are hence
allowed to make arbitrary learning moves in real time to
experiment without compromising the load balance as socket
agents will ensure that policy  is complied at all times. 3
There is a vast amount of technical literature on game theory
[19] which is at the core of the solution to the game highlighted
in this section. For example in [31], and in the context of
multi-agent learning framework, the use of game theory [19]
and reinforcement learning [32] was investigated. In [31] the
authors study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents
may have different preferences. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to further expand on more elaborated aspects of this
game and its solution. This is left for further research.
VII. FINAL REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a distributed recharging rate control
algorithm which combines the objectives of regulating fre-
quency and improving utilization of generators by creating
an incentive policy for autonomous EV that are randomly
connecting to and disconnecting from the electric grid. The
incentive policy  encourages EVs to demand energy when
non-EV demand is low and utilization of electric generators
needs to be improved. EVs also act as frequency regulators
which can control their participation role by modifying their
respective payment rate wi;1 as individual EVs connect and
disconnect at arbitrary times.
The proposed recharging rate control algorithm can be
used to realize a DM solution to, for example, reconcile
EVs energy demand profiles with the output of available
energy sources. Furthermore, encouraging results show that the
3Note that since EV agents will learn their recharging strategies based on
the value of , they should restrain from learning when either message SSL
or message LSS is active.
proposed recharging rate control algorithm can help decrease
the required size of frequency regulating turbines.
We now highlight three aspects of the proposed framework
that have not been addressed in this paper. i) The emergent
behaviour of the EV agent population as a function of their
demand submission strategies when their reward and cost
functions are defined, ii) the capacity control for recharging
EVs that is to be solved as a revenue management problem,
and iii) the quantification of decrease in size of frequency
regulating turbines as a function of parked and recharging
EVs. The preliminary results presented in this paper suggest
that all of the above outstanding aspects are worth further
investigation.
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